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The Constitutionalization of Indian Private Law  
 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh* 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 It may appear a little out of place to find a discussion of private law embedded into a 
handbook on Indian constitutional law. Constitutional law is after all at the core of public law, 
against the backdrop of which private law is commonly understood. Private law is routinely 
conceptualized as the body of law that applies to horizontal interactions between individuals in 
their capacities as private actors.1 This is in contrast to public law, which focuses primarily on 
the vertical relationship between the state and the individual, or between different state actors.2 
Constitutional law, administrative law, and criminal law are taken to be paradigmatic of the 
latter, while the common law areas of tort law, contract law, property law, and other advanced 
regimes that build on these common law subjects (e.g., intellectual property law, or the law of 
commercial arbitration) form the mainstay of the former.3  
 The interaction between public law and private law has generated a good deal of 
scholarly attention over the years.4 While public law and private law are often treated as 
analytically distinct in theory, in actual practice the divide between the two often breaks down. 
When this occurs, ideas, concepts and devices from one move into or influence the other. The 
most common situation where this occurs is in relation to the doctrine of “horizontal effects,” 
wherein a constitutional directive or norm is interpreted by courts to apply horizontally, i.e., as 
between individuals.5 The South African Constitution, for instance, expressly renders its Bill of 
Rights applicable to the horizontal context.6 Another common way in which public law and 
private law interact is when courts either explicitly or implicitly employ ideas and concepts from 
constitutional law in interpreting and applying private law concepts.7 Additionally, in some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to participants at the Roundtable organized by the 
Editors of this volume in New Delhi, for valuable comments and suggestions.  
 
1 Michael Rosenfeld, Rethinking the Boundaries between Public Law and Private Law for the Twenty-First Century: An 
Introduction, 11 INT’L J. CON. L. 125, 126 (2013); Alon Harel, Public Law and Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL LAW (Markus D Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., forthcoming 2014). 
2 Rosenfeld, supra note __, at 125. 
3 Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 
843, 847 (2006) (discussing the traditional coverage of the term “private law”); id. at 125; Harel, supra note __, at __ (adding tax 
law to the substantive areas covered by public law). 
4 For early important work see: Roscoe Pound, Public Law and Private Law, 24 CORNELL L. QUART. 469 (1939); John Henry 
Merryman, The Public Law-Private Law Distinction in European and American Law, 17 J. PUB. L. 3 (1968). For more recent 
work, see: HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW (Daniel Friedmann & Daphne Barak-Erez eds. 2001); GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATE 
LAW (Michael Faure & Andre van der Walt eds. 2010); Aharon Barak, Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law, 3 REV. 
CONST. STUDS. 218 (1996); Peter Goodrich, The Political Theology of Private Law, 11 INT’L J. CON. L. 146 (2013). 
5 See Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387 (2003) 
6 S.A. CONST., s. 12(2) (“[T]he Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking 
into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.”). 
7 Barak describes this as the “application to the judiciary model” of having public law ideals influence private law. See Barak, 
supra note __, at 226, 238-43. 
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jurisdictions public law ideals and elements come to influence private law by imposing 
constraints on what the judiciary, understood as a “state actor” can and cannot do in applying a 
substantive common law rule.8 The U.S. Supreme Court adopted this approach in its landmark 
decision on racially restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer, where it found that a court’s 
enforcement of a substantive private law rule to produce a discriminatory result was itself a 
violation of the equal protection guarantee.9 What is interesting about these analytical 
spillovers—all of which have the effect of transcending the public law/private law divide—is the 
reality that they are almost always seen by scholars as palpably beneficial, and as producing 
functional synergies that the rigidity of the traditional distinction fails to enable. 
 While the interaction between public law and private law might indeed produce important 
benefits in individual cases, less commonly acknowledged among courts and scholars is the 
reality that such an interaction might also generate several undesirable systemic results: both 
structural and substantive. It is this hitherto underappreciated phenomenon that I explore in this 
Chapter, focusing on the interaction between Indian constitutional law and Indian tort law. Using 
the context of the Indian Supreme Court’s dramatic expansion of its fundamental rights 
jurisprudence over the last three decades, I argue that while the Court’s conscious and systematic 
effort to transcend the public law/private law divide and incorporate concepts and mechanisms 
from the latter into the former might have produced a few immediate and highly salient benefits 
for the public law side of the system, its long terms effects on India’s private law edifice have 
been devastating. The Court’s fusion of constitutional law and tort law has successfully cabined 
the independent efficacy, normativity, and analytical basis of equivalent private law claims in 
Indian lower courts. Coupled with the unique history of India’s various basic private law 
regimes, and the legal system’s concerted failure to strengthen these regimes after independence, 
the Court’s efforts have only served to undermine the overall legitimacy of India’s private law 
mechanisms. While this phenomenon is most apparent in relation to tort law in India, it persists 
to a lesser degree in other areas of private law as well, such as contract law and property law. 
Yet, in all the discussions of India’s progressive fundamental rights jurisprudence, one finds no 
mention whatsoever of its effects on Indian private law.10 
 This Essay unfolds in three parts. Part I provides a brief analytical discussion of the 
public law/private law distinction, and situates it within the unique contingencies of the Indian 
legal system and the historical processes through which the bulk of its private law and public law 
regimes came into existence. Part II analyzes the Indian Supreme Court’s jurisprudence—
beginning in the mid-1980s—that recognized the analytics of the public law/private law divide, 
but nonetheless chose to collapse it. This Part shows that the Court’s fusion of the two bodies 
was neither incidental nor unintended but was instead a direct effort to expand India’s public law 
(i.e., fundamental rights) jurisprudence to new domains, in the interests of justice. Finally, Part 
III takes a step back and critically examines the hitherto unappreciated effects of the merger 
identified in Part II: analytical, doctrinal, and expressive. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1985). 
9 334 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1948). For an excellent discussion of the case and its connection to equality, see: Mark Tushnet, Shelley v. 
Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 383 (1988). 
10 Even accounts that are critical of the rights revolution tend to ignore the effects on India’s private law system. See, e.g., S.K. 
DAS, INDIA’S RIGHTS REVOLUTION: HAS IT WORKED FOR THE POOR? (2013). 
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I. PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE LAW IN THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
 While the modern distinction between private law and public law is usually traced back 
to Roman law,11 few if any would claim that it can be understood and operationalized with 
conceptual clarity. As noted previously, the distinction is ordinarily described as lying in the 
difference between the vertical and horizontal operation of legal rules. Constitutional law, 
criminal law, and administrative law represent bodies of law that govern the interactions between 
the various branches of government or between the government and individual subjects, and are 
taken to form the staple of public law.12 By contrast, areas that focus on the interaction between 
subjects in their private capacities, most prominently the common law subjects of tort, contract, 
property, and unjust enrichment, are paradigmatic of private law.13 Other more specialized areas 
tend to draw a little from both categories in so far as they rely on basic common law principles 
(e.g., ownership, agreements), but superimpose on that basic framework additional regulatory 
and public policy goals.  
Very importantly, the public law/private law distinction is less about the character of the 
actors involved and more about the structural nature of the legal directives that govern and 
influence the relationship in question. Government actors thus routinely enter into agreements 
and contracts with private individuals (or other government actors) and in so doing enter the 
domain of private law in so far as their relationship—as contracting parties—is predominantly 
horizontal. Similarly, when an essential government function is delegated to a private 
corporation, its relationship to the individuals that it provides its services to starts to partake of 
public law, since its directives now operate vertically despite the formal nature of the corporation 
as a private entity. The distinction is therefore hardly wedded to the character of the entities 
involved even though there remains a strong correlation to that effect. 
All the same, it certainly isn’t the case that the state plays no role whatsoever in private 
law. In private law settings, recourse to the state’s coercive machinery is left to the discretion of 
private actors; or, specifically, the private actor who is vested with a legally cognizable claim. 
The law defines the relationship between parties through its traditional normative apparatus, but 
then takes a step back to allow parties to play out the consequences—positive or negative—of 
the relationship in question. The state plays a background role, of a safety net, in private law 
dealings unlike in the public law context where the state is a direct participant.14 The state’s 
“background” role in private law settings imbues private law with a rather distinctive claim to 
legal normativity, in turn constructed through the language of rights and duties that the state-
created (private law) doctrine sets up before stepping out of the relationship.15 Scholars continue 
to disagree over whether private law can indeed exist without the state altogether; an issue that 
while interesting, need not detain us here.16 
In most of the English-speaking world, the basic areas of private law—i.e, property, torts, 
and contracts—are primarily common law subjects. They were historically created and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See, e.g., W.W. BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW (1939). 
12 See supra note 3 and sources therein. 
13 John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (2012). 
14 This idea is best captured by the civil recourse theory of private law. As one scholar aptly puts it, in tort law (and all of private 
law) “[t]he state does not impose liability on its own initiative…[i]t does so in response to a plaintiff's suit demanding that the 
defendant be so required.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 699 (2003). 
15 See Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity of Private Law, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 221-29 (2011). 
16 See, e.g., Michaels & Jansen, supra note __ (providing an overview of this disagreement). 
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developed by courts from within the contexts of individual disputes, and despite their piecemeal 
codification, courts continue to retain a fairly significant role in their continuing growth and 
evolution. This is especially true in both the U.S. and in England, where private law remains 
strongly associated with the common law. The story of Indian private law and of its modern day 
eclipse by Indian constitutional law is fairly different, and must begin with its somewhat 
spurious origins.  
In the last half of the nineteenth century, the colonial government in India embarked on a 
rather extensive project of codifying the common law for all of British India.17 Following the 
failure of the “codification movement” in England and the U.S., India emerged as a prime 
candidate for testing the fruitfulness of the codification exercise.18 Between 1860 and 1910, the 
British government in India enacted fifteen laws into effect, and among them were several areas 
of private law, most notably the laws of contract and unjust enrichment, property law, and the 
law of private remedies.19 While Indian tort law was initially on the list of areas intended for 
legislative intervention, it eventually escaped being codified despite a draft Bill being 
commissioned by the Indian government from Sir Frederick Pollock.20 In each of the areas that 
did come to be codified, the (British) codifiers began with the basic rules of English common 
law and modified them as they deemed most appropriate for Indian society. In so doing, they 
routinely employed the use of clear, bright-line rules, and precisely drafted definitions and 
illustrations, all with the conscious design of minimizing judicial discretion and unpredictable 
legal change.21 The direct result of this codification exercise was that it effectively distanced 
Indian private law from the common law and its intrinsic generativity.  
Following the codification, Indian courts came to treat private law disputes as entailing 
little more than the interpretation and application of legislative directives. At Indian 
independence, the Indian constitution drafters thought it wise to keep all pre-independence 
legislation in place until the Indian Parliament saw it necessary to replace them with newer 
versions, and expressly afforded such legislation continuing validity under the new constitutional 
system.22 In the six decades after Indian independence this replacement has only rarely occurred, 
even though the codes themselves have been amended on the margins. As a result, much of 
Indian private law is today contained in late nineteenth century colonial legislation, consciously 
enacted (at the time) with the idea of minimizing judicial lawmaking and creativity. Indian 
private law is therefore “common law” in content though not in process, approach and style. 
Indian courts are relegated to an unequivocally subservient position vis-à-vis the legislature in 
formulating the directives and content of private law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See generally 1 WHITLEY STOKES, THE ANGLO-INDIAN CODES (1887). 
18 Mathias Reimann, The Historical School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter, and the Defeat of the New York Civil Code, 37 
AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 96 (1989); Wienczyslaw J. Wagner, Codification of Law in Europe and the Codification Movement in the 
Middle of the Nineteenth Century in the United States, 2 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 335 (1952). 
19 STOKES, supra note __, at ix. 
20 See FREDERICK POLLOCK,  THE LAW OF TORTS :  A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN 
THE COMMON LAW  556-58 (1887) (detailing the idea behind the Bill, and expressing frustration at its failure to be enacted). 
21 For an account of how this worked in the context of Indian property law, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Codifying the Common 
Law of Property in India: Crystallization and Standardization as Strategies of Constraint, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 
2015). 
22 CONST. OF INDIA, Art. 372(1) (“[A]ll the laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this 
Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent 
authority.”). 
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As noted earlier, Indian tort law managed to avoid the early codification exercise, though 
for political reasons. All the same, in the early twentieth century, the British enacted a series of 
specialized enactments each of which provided for civil redress (i.e., compensation) mechanisms 
within the context of particular activities that were believed to commonly produce accidental  
harm to life and property. Following independence, Parliament systematically updated and in 
some instances even replaced these specialized codes with newer ones. For instance, 
compensation for motor vehicle accidents is today covered by the Motor Vehicles Act of 1989, 
which replaced the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939; compensation for workplace injuries continues 
to be governed by the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1923; and injuries relating to the Indian 
railways are governed by the liability provisions of the Railways Act of 1989, which replaced the 
prior Act of 1890. In a few instances, Parliament intervened decades after independence to 
introduce an altogether new enactment dealing with an area. The Consumer Protection Act of 
1986 is one such example, and today deals with products (and services) liability. Indian tort law 
is for the most part today comprised of a set of specialized liability regimes, each dealing with a 
unique area of activity. Each of these enactments contains a detailed set of provisions allowing 
defendants to claim compensation from a wrongdoer, by approaching either a lower court or a 
specialized tribunal or authority. Courts treat these enactments as having exhausted the field in 
question and generally restrict themselves to interpreting and applying the law. They interpret 
and apply these specialized enactments in essentially the same way that they do other areas of 
general private law. Judicial lawmaking in all of Indian private law is as a result for the most 
part, simply non-existent. 
In stark contrast to this, modern Indian public law especially constitution law, is almost 
entirely the product of far-reaching changes introduced by the country’s higher judiciary. As is 
well known, these changes have involved both substantive and procedural components. Ever 
since the 1980s, the Indian Supreme Court has expanded the constitution’s protections for 
various fundamental rights to encompass progressive socio-economic rights.23 Simultaneously, it 
has also loosened the restrictions on when and how an aggrieved party can approach the court for 
relief. Most of these changes are captured in what is commonly described as India’s “Public 
Interest Litigation” revolution.24 
The disparate institutional bases of change in the two areas—i.e., public law and private 
law—may seem somewhat anomalous at first. What prevented the Indian higher judiciary from 
playing a more active role in reforming Indian private law, just as it had done for Indian 
constitutional law? A good part of the answer lies in the unique synthesis of substantive and 
structural change that the courts’ public law changes entailed, and which were infeasible in the 
private law context. The most far-reaching changes introduced by the Indian Supreme Court (i.e., 
the PIL reforms) came about in the exercise of the court’s original writ jurisdiction, contained in 
Article 32 of the Indian constitution. Article 32, somewhat uniquely, is both a jurisdiction-
enabling provision and a substantive fundamental right, the “right to move the Supreme Court” 
for the enforcement of fundamental rights.25 This dual jurisdiction/right provision allowed the 
Court to both make far reaching substantive changes to the rights themselves and simultaneously 
see to their implementation on its own, without having to remand matters back to lower courts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See, e.g., P.P. Craig & S.L. Deshpande, Rights, Autonomy and Process: Public Interest Litigation in India, 9 OXFORD J. LEG. 
STUD. 356 (1989); Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 495 (1989). 
24 Id. 
25 CONST. OF INDIA, Art. 32. 
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for this task. The Court’s expansion of parties’ standing was thus as much about expanding it 
own jurisdiction as it was about furthering litigants’ access to justice.26 Personal (institutional) 
oversight over implementation fueled both the willingness of the Court to introduce substantive 
changes and legitimized it, by ensuring that such changes didn't remain without effect. While this 
trend was begun by the Supreme Court, High Courts soon followed suit, vested with their 
analogous but less far-reaching writ jurisdiction for fundamental rights under Article 226 of the 
constitution.27 
Most private law actions under Indian law are to be commenced in the lower judiciary, at 
the district court level. The higher judiciary (the Supreme Court and the several High Courts) 
retains no more than appellate jurisdiction in this area. Consequently, even if the higher courts 
were to introduce far-reaching changes to the substantive content of the law—much as they did 
in the constitutional context—the primary responsibility to implement these changes in 
individual cases would fall to lower courts. Not only would there be no way of guaranteeing that 
this would be successful, but India’s lower judiciary has long been characterized by extended 
delays and a host of additional structural issues, all of which would have masked the salience and 
utility of any substantive reform.28 This explains the Indian higher judiciary’s disparate approach 
to common law style substantive lawmaking in the public law and private law arenas ever since 
Indian independence. Perhaps more importantly though, it also explains why the Indian higher 
judiciary has felt the recurrent urge to address private law questions through its public law 
apparatus whenever possible, an issue to which we next turn. 
 
 
II. PRIVATE (TORT) LAW AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN INDIA 
 
 Public interest litigation began in India in the early 1980s, primarily in cases where state 
actors such as prison officials had mistreated prisoners, usually through physical abuse. In 
exercising its plenary jurisdiction under Article 32 to protect and enforce the constitution’s 
fundamental rights, the Supreme Court’s first move was to relax the requirement of locus standi 
to allow third parties to petition the Court in any way or form for relief.29 In later cases, the Court 
interpreted its powers to allow it to consider a matter on its own motion (suo moto), effectively 
eliminating both the standing requirement and the need for an actual case or controversy to arise 
as preconditions for the exercise of its jurisdiction.30 
 These early public interest litigation cases were in essence constitutional tort actions, 
where the petitioner was assailing a state actor for its action or omission, and alleging that such 
act or omission had violated a protected fundamental right (contained in Part III of the 
constitution). In its genesis, the Supreme Court’s merger of constitutional law and tort law under 
the rubric of public interest litigation was less than deliberate, but instead the direct result of its 
liberal allowance for compensatory awards during such actions. Fairly early on in the 
development of public interest litigation, the Court began allowing successful petitioners to 
recover monetary damages. In Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar,31 Chief Justice Chandrachud 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Craig & Deshpande, supra note __, at 359-64. 
27 CONST. OF INDIA, Art. 226(1). 
28 See, e.g., Robert Moog, Delays in the Indian Courts: Why the Judges Don't Take Control, 16 JUS. SYS. J. 19 (1992).  
29 Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149. 
30 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802, 813. 
31 (1983) 3 S.C.R. 508. 
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endorsed this practice, but recognized an obvious dilemma. Allowing a litigant to seek damages 
in a writ petition (i.e., a public interest litigation action) rather than through an ordinary civil suit 
could result in the ordinary judicial process coming to be circumvented. At the same time, failing 
to make such awards might undermine the very efficacy—and not to mention legitimacy—of 
public interest litigation. The Court in Rudul Shah eventually chose to award the petitioner 
monetary damages and noted than in doing so it was both “mulct[ing]” violators and offering a 
“palliative” for victims. The Court was in essence then explicitly imbuing such recovery with 
both compensatory and punitive/exemplary elements.32 
With Rudul Shah the Court cemented its practice of issuing damage awards in successful 
public interest litigation petitions. The dual-purpose argument also gave the Court significant 
discretion in fixing the quantum of these awards. In due course, the Court began to expand the 
subject matter of claims brought under the rubric of public interest litigation, while continuing to 
award petitioners monetary compensation.33 Whereas the early cases had involved deliberate or 
intentional governmental action (e.g., unlawful detention, torture of prisoners, etc.), in later cases 
the Court became far more willing to extend liability to situations where the state actor had 
omitted to take any action. In so collapsing the act/omission distinction, public interest litigation 
thus came to be extended to situations where governmental inaction had been a factor in harm 
suffered by a victim.  
With this expansion in subject matter, the Court’s approach in public interest litigation 
cases started bearing a stark resemblance to traditional private law based tort claims. This was 
most obvious in medical negligence cases involving government-run hospitals.34 A government 
hospital’s failure to provide treatment or in negligently providing treatment could now be the 
subject of a writ petition against the government, rather than the subject of a simple negligence 
action against the doctors or hospital staff, and a court could award the petitioner compensation 
under either approach. The petitioner had “rights” against both sets of parties: a fundamental 
right against the government, and a private law right against the private party. From a 
petitioner’s (i.e., victim’s) perspective, bringing the action as a writ petition however held 
innumerable advantages. Most important among these were the expedited nature of the process, 
and the reality that a court’s decision in its writ jurisdiction did not require an elaborate factual 
record but could instead be disposed off on affidavit evidence without further testimony. This 
practice was hardly unique to the Supreme Court, and was soon followed in equal measure by 
the various High Courts in the exercise of their own writ jurisdiction under Article 226.35 This 
expansion of scope, coverage, and remedial framework in constitutional jurisdiction brought the 
Indian higher judiciary’s public law jurisprudence into direct conflict with private law, i.e., tort 
law, a reality that litigants themselves (especially defendants) began to recognize.   
It wasn’t until the year 2000 that the Court directly confronted the question of whether its 
practice of awarding petitioners compensation under its writ jurisdiction—and for a variety of 
subject areas—amounted to a usurpation of private law, i.e., tort law. In Chairman, Railway 
Board v. Chandrima Das,36 the Court was presented with a case where a petition was brought by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Id. at 514. 
33 See, e.g., Bhim Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 494; Hongray v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 571; 
Behera v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1960. 
34 See Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 4 S.C.C. 37. 
35 See, e.g., Raza v. Superintendent, Central Jail, 1985 Crim. L.J. 642 (M.P.);  Thressia v. Kerala State Elec. Bd., A.I.R. 1988 
Kerala 206 (Kerala); Kalawati v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1988) 2 A.C.C. 192 (H.P.); Gandhi v. Union of India, (1988) 2 
M.L.J. 493 (Madras); Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (1991) 2 W.L.N. 507 (Rajasthan). 
36 A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 988. 
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a civil rights lawyer on behalf of a foreign national who had been brutally gang raped by railway 
employees at a government-owned railway station. The events in question happened when the 
employees were off-duty, but on premises owned and run by the government. The petition 
specifically sought monetary compensation for the victim from the government alleging that its 
failure to protect the victim and prevent the crime violated the victim’s fundamental rights. As a 
procedural matter, the petition was brought before the Calcutta High Court under Article 226, 
and the High Court’s award was then appealed to the Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court, the 
defendant (the government entity) openly objected to the award of any compensation in the case, 
and argued that doing so amounted to a usurpation of private law by the higher courts in the 
exercise of their writ jurisdiction. Areas of private law such as tort law, the defendant argued, 
required an elaborate factual record before compensation could be granted; and the writ process 
was ill-equipped to do this, since witnesses were never examined and evidence was only ever 
presented on affidavit. While these arguments found little favor with the Court,37 it nonetheless 
forced the Court to confront the private law/public law distinction and the argument that its writ 
jurisdiction had run roughshod over it. 
Not surprisingly, upon examining the issue the Court merely reaffirmed its past practice 
and that of the several High Courts, but now purported to find a logical basis for the overlap. 
Using conclusory language, the Court observed that “[w]here public functionaries are involved 
and the matter relates to the violation of Fundamental Rights or the enforcement of public duties 
the remedy would still be available under the Public Law notwithstanding that a suit could be 
filed for damages under Private Law.38” Since the crime of rape amounted to a violation of the 
victim’s right to life under Article 21 of the constitution, the Court concluded that a public law 
remedy was wholly appropriate, since it was “not a mere violation of an ordinary right.39” What 
is important to note here is that the Court was directly responding to the usurpation argument by 
expressly preserving the parallel nature of public law and private claims for the same set of facts, 
since they trigger two different types of rights (i.e., fundamental and ordinary). The Court’s 
reasoning now expressly recognized a parallel jurisdiction, which to its mind alleviated the 
concern with usurpation. This parallelism also liberated the Court in another important way—at 
the substantive level. By recognizing that its public law jurisprudence was relying on private law 
but was nonetheless distinct from it, the Court was now in a position to modify (or abandon) any 
substantive private law constraints that it saw as impediments to the protection of constitutional 
rights in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The private law requirement of causation, central to 
all tort claims, was one such impediment. In fact, the Court in Chandrima Das, even went so far 
as to eliminate the “course of employment” requirement for vicarious liability in public law-
based tort claims, since the actors in the case were unambiguously acting beyond the scope of 
their employment when they sexually assaulted the victim.40 Their—wholly private—actions 
were now causally imputed to their employers in order to award the petitioner damages. 
The decision in Chandrima Das marked an important turning point in the merger of 
public law and private law in India. Not only did the Court formally validate all of what had been 
going on before but it now equipped the higher judiciary with a superficial analytical basis with 
which to render the merger functionally complete. First, it told High Courts around the country 
that they were free to continue awarding petitioners compensation in the exercise of their writ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Id. at 993. 
38 Id. at 994. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 999-1000. 
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jurisdiction and on the basis of lower evidentiary standards, since the petitioners were always at 
liberty to commence an independent private law action. The public law action was in other 
words, no longer to be seen as being in lieu of a private law claim, but as serving an independent 
(and more important) purpose. Second, it now authorized courts to freely modify the substance 
of private law actions when brought as public law claims, since the public law dimension of the 
claim now imbued it with a different purpose, which in turn could override certain private law 
constraints. This could be at the level of the claim (e.g., causation) or at the level of remedy (e.g., 
computation of damages). 
Following Chandrima Das, High Courts around the country began exercising their writ 
jurisdiction more freely to award petitioners monetary compensation in a variety of substantive 
settings. The absence of a developed factual record was no longer seen as an impediment, and 
many courts took this to suggest the absence of a genuine dispute about the events in question. 
Thus for instance, in one prominent case involving loss of life from a large fire in a movie 
theatre, the Delhi High Court readily exercised its writ jurisdiction against the theatre owner and 
the municipal authorities to award the petitioners compensatory and punitive damages.41 In so 
doing, it expressly noted how liberated it was from the traditional constraints of private law 
adjudication: 
 
[I]n the exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, we are not required to 
go into the factual details of the matter nor without sufficient material before us we are in a 
position to hold as to what extent each of the parties involved were negligent. However, on the 
basis of the admitted facts on record about which there cannot be any controversy between the 
parties, we are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently 
dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the safety of persons working in the premises 
or vicinity, owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the patrons who visit the same to ensure 
that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherent nature of the activity which it 
has undertaken.42 
 
Negligence, in other words, no longer had to be alleged or proven for liability! A cinema theatre 
was an inherently dangerous undertaking, which would trigger absolute liability for any harm; a 
rather dramatic expansion of the law. Other High Courts across the country soon did the same in 
a variety of substantive areas and contexts such as medical negligence,43 electrocution,44 
wrongful conception,45 negligent infection,46 accidents at railway crossings47 and several others. 
 As this trend continued unabated, a few courts began to worry about the sufficiency of 
evidence for their decisions.48 The issue became especially important in the rare instances where 
the defendant expressly disputed the existence of the injury or a causal connection to its actions. 
When the question eventually reached the Supreme Court, it concluded that a court’s exercise of 
its writ jurisdiction would be inappropriate when there were real disputed questions of fact that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Assoc’n of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy v. Union of India, (2003) 2 A.C.C. 114.  
42 Id. at ___. 
43 See, e.g., Ramar v. Director of Medical and Rural Health Services, (2011) 1 M.L.J. 1409; Thangapandi v. Director of Primary 
Health Services, (2011) 1 M.L.J. 1329. 
44 See, e.g., Kumar v. Himachal Pradesh Electricity Board, 1995 A.C.J. 1146. 
45 See, e.g., Shobha v. Gov’t of N.C.T. of Delhi, (2006) 3 A.C.C. 145. 
46 See, e.g., Vijaya v. Chairman, Singareni Collieries Company Ltd, (2002) 1 A.C.C. 32.  
47 See, e.g., Behera v. D.R.M. East Coast Railway, _____________. 
48 See, e.g., Kumari v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 2069. 
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required additional evidence.49 The Court was quick to add that the restriction applied only to the 
higher judiciary’s writ jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226, and that it did not restrain its own 
power to address the matter under Article 142,50 which allowed the Court to pass any order 
“necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter.51”  
To the extent that such factual disputes could operate as a limit on courts’ writ 
jurisdiction in tort cases, the question nonetheless remained of how the court is to ascertain 
whether such a dispute does in fact exist. And here, the Court’s guidance to high courts was 
sufficiently open-ended so as to render the limit meaningless. If there was “negligence on the 
fact of it,” a court was entitled to exercise its writ jurisdiction, but not otherwise.52 In practice, it 
has only been in the exceptional situation that a High Court has refused to find such negligence 
on the record. The net effect of this standard was that it extended tort law’s rule of res ipsa 
loquitur to just about any claim brought using a court’s writ jurisdiction. Additionally, the 
“negligence on the face of it” standard created an active incentive for High Courts to avoid 
acknowledging the very existence of any factual disagreement between the parties since such an 
acknowledgement would have required them to avoid hearing the case.53  
In summary then, the subsumption of tort law and private law ideas into Indian 
constitutional law jurisprudence was both gradual and deliberate. Much of the impetus for the 
merger can be traced back to early constitutional law decisions and their insistence on awarding 
victims discretionary monetary awards for rights violations by state actors. When the subject 
matter of such public interest claims expanded, the absence of any real limits on courts’ 
discretionary power to award compensation effectively resulted in the creation of a parallel form 
of private law adjudication under the rubric of a public law system of redress. What is perhaps 
more surprising than the actual phenomenon itself however is the fact that this merger—and its 
consequences—have been altogether ignored by scholars of Indian law.54 
 
 
III. UNEXPLORED CONSEQUENCES 
 
 The hybrid public law/tort claim described in the previous Part—wherein a private law 
claim is brought as a public law action against a state actor, rather than as a private action against 
a private actor—is today a staple of the Indian constitutional law landscape. There is little doubt 
that it has produced important short term benefits for litigants, by expediting their ability to be 
heard, and by minimizing the system’s reliance on formalities. It has also without question 
generated important benefits for the Indian higher judiciary as well, seen in the public’s 
perception of its efficacy and responsiveness. Yet, its effects on the role of private law in the 
overall landscape of the Indian legal system have gone altogether unnoticed, primarily because 
these effects have been less obvious and immediate. While detailing these effects is worthy of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Chairman, Grid Corp. v. Sukamani Das, (1999) Supp. 2. S.C.C. 458; Tamil Nadu Elec. Bd. v. Sumathi, (2000) 4 S.C.C. 543.  
50 Id. at ___.  
51 CONST. OF INDIA, Art. 142. 
52 Tamil Nadu Elec. Bd. v. Sumathi, (2000) 4 S.C.C. 543, ___. 
53 One astute High Court’s effort to supplement its factual record by choosing to exercise its writ jurisdiction and then referring 
the factual dispute to a court-appointed arbitrator was met with disapproval by the Supreme Court, which viewed the very 
acknowledgement of the factual dispute as necessitating a decline of jurisdiction. See Tamil Nadu Elec. Bd. v. Sumathi, (2000) 4 
S.C.C. 543. 
54 See Madhav Khosla, Making Social Rights Conditional: Lessons from India, 8 INT’L J. CON. L. 739, 756 (2010) (“Within 
Indian legal scholarship, there has been no effort to understand such [public interest litigation] cases as involving tort actions.”). 
11 
 
own separate treatment, this Part outlines the nature and scope of these consequences, leaving for 
another time and place a more elaborate analysis. 
 Before describing these consequences however, an important caveat is in order. The 
suggestion that the constitutionalization of Indian tort law has contributed to the problems 
described below, should not be taken to imply that Indian tort law (or private law more 
generally) was somehow unproblematic prior to this process. Indeed, the contrary is indeed true. 
In addition to being substantively underdeveloped and ossified in statutory language, the Indian 
private law system has been continually haunted by the problem of exorbitant court fees, 
rendering its very availability to private individuals fairly elusive. Writing in 1958, the Law 
Commission of India famously noted that  
 
India is…the only country under a modern system of government which deters a person who has 
been deprived of his property or whose legal rights have been infringed from seeking redress by 
imposing a tax on the remedy he seeks…The [court] fee which we charge is so excessive that the 
civil litigant seeking to enforce his legal right pays not only the entire cost of the administration 
of civil justice but also the cost incurred by the State in prosecuting and punishing criminals for 
crimes with which the civil litigant has no concern.55 
 
Given these exorbitant fees, traditional tort law claims within the civil justice system have for 
long remained beyond the reach of ordinary litigants, and the public law/tort law jurisprudence 
can be seen as a mechanism designed to remedy—at least partially—that system-wide malaise, 
among others. Yet in so doing, it has itself contributed to the problem in by directing attention 
away from a reform of the private law system; and indeed produced a series of secondary 
problems for tort law litigation in India as a whole, which is what I outline below. 
 
1. Substantive Neglect 
 
The most direct consequence of tort claims being addressed through public law 
adjudication has been the stagnation of substantive tort law qua private law in India. The 
doctrinal and institutional impoverishment of Indian tort law has been the subject of extensive 
discussion ever since the Bhopal disaster, where the Indian legal system first confronted the 
inadequacies of its private law mechanisms.56 In the years since, hardly any serious effort has 
been made to strengthen the substantive and institutional content of tort law in India.57 Very few 
tort law cases make it to the higher judiciary on appeal, leaving the lower courts at liberty to 
develop and apply the general rules of tort law to individual disputes with little supervision. 
Additionally, the reality that lower court decisions are never reported in the Indian system leaves 
litigants with a good deal of uncertainty about the area.58 
Against this backdrop, the development of the hybrid public law/tort claim has essentially 
proven to be a distraction. By raising the salience of substantive tort questions (e.g., negligence, 
causation) only within the context of writ adjudications, the legal system has at once relegated 
the content of traditional private law adjudication to a veritable backseat and simultaneously 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 1 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, FOURTEENTH REPORT: REFORM OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 487 (1958). 
56 For an excellent account, see: Marc Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in India After the Bhopal Tragedy, 
20 TEX. INT’L L.J. 273, 275 (1985) (“The absence of tort claims is reinforced by, and reinforces, the absence of tort doctrine.”). 
57 See JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL (1993). 
58 This is somewhat perplexing and is yet to be examined in any detail by scholars. One suspects that it is largely because Indian 
lower courts are not “courts of record” under the Indian constitutional structure.  
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minimized the perceived urgency of real reform in the area. The law of medical negligence is a 
prime example. While a private law claim for medical negligence has existed in India for 
decades now, the law has long been shrouded in a good deal of uncertainty about the appropriate 
legal standard that courts need to employ when adjudicating such claims,59 and in computing 
damages.60 This uncertainty has in turn resulted in plaintiffs rarely ever succeeding in such cases. 
By contrast, courts have almost never hesitated to find for petitioners when deciding such (i.e., 
medical negligence) claims as writ petitions against government doctors and hospitals, and in 
awarding damages in such claims. And whereas mechanisms for computing damages in private 
law claims continue to remain controversial, contested, and unclear; hardly any court (or litigant) 
has questioned the way in which courts compute compensatory awards in their writ jurisdiction, 
for the very same subject matter. With the exponential growth of public law tort actions, it is 
unrealistic to expect any comprehensive reform of private law-based tort adjudication in the 
conceivable future, since the former is systemically structured as a substitute for the latter. 
 
2. Doctrinal Manipulation  
 
Even more troubling than the neglect of tort law as a private law subject in India has been 
the manner in which the higher judiciary’s jurisprudence (of tort law in the public law domain) 
has modified and obfuscated many of the area’s core mechanisms and devices. While the public 
law/tort law claims entertained by the Supreme Court and the High Courts build on core tort law 
ideas, the unique structural constraints that this method of adjudication operates under has 
required these courts to effectuate important and far-reaching modifications to established tort 
law doctrine. We noted a prime example earlier, where one court expressly noted that it was “not 
required” to undertake a fact-finding exercise to determine the existence of negligence on the 
part of the defendant, and that it was instead developing a theory of “absolute liability” for such 
situations, since they were exceptional.61 What the court of course fails to mention is that a 
determination of absolute liability requires very little factual investigation on its part, besides 
proof of actual harm (i.e., something that an affidavit based system is perfectly suited to). The 
court’s substantive reasoning and its new rule were thus driven almost entirely by the unique 
adjudicative structure involved, rather than by a considered need for a change in the rule. Along 
the same lines is the courts’ expansion of the idea of vicarious liability to impose liability on 
government agencies for actions committed by their employees even when well outside the 
formal scope of their employment, or the courts’ ready imposition of a duty of care for 
nonfeasance, almost unheard of in most other common law jurisdictions. 
Changes along these lines aren’t just problematic from a substantive point of view. They 
are additionally troublesome in so far as they are likely to not be limited to the unique needs of 
the adjudicative structure within which they are developed. Consequently, to lower courts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For the doctrinal confusion that the area has engendered, see: Jacob Matthew v. Union of India, (2005) 6 S.C.C. 1; Martin F. 
D’Souza v. Mohd. Ishaq, (2009) 3 S.C.C. 1; B. Jagadish v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 1 S.C.C. 681; Nizam’s Institute of 
Medical Sciences v. Prasanth S. Dhananka, (2009) 6 S.C.C. 1; V. Krishan Rao v. Nikhil Super Specialty Hospital, (2010) 5 
S.C.C. 513. 
60 In a recent landmark case, the Court ordered a private actor to pay out an uncharacteristically large sum of money, based on the 
earning potential of the victim. Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha, (2014) 1 S.C.C. 384. The case garnered much publicity, principally 
because it was a major deviation from how courts had approached damage awards in such cases for years. Gayathri 
Vaidyanathan, A Landmark Turn in India’s Medical Negligence Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/a-landmark-turn-in-indias-medical-negligence-law/.  
61 Assoc’n of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy v. Union of India, (2003) 2 A.C.C. 114. 
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looking for guidance on substantive law, these modifications in doctrine might have a 
generalizable dimension, and come to be seen as no different from modifications made in the 
higher judiciary’s exercise of its appellate authority over private law cases.62 Such strategic 
manipulation of doctrine to suit the exigencies of the courts’ writ jurisdiction could thus indelibly 
come to represent the tort law of India. 
 
3. Moral Hazard  
 
As an analytical matter, public law based tort claims present an additional problem. 
Recall that these claims involve imposing liability on state actors and institutions for actions 
committed by private individuals with or without actual governmental authorization. 
Additionally, such claims are meant to operate in parallel with traditional private law claims over 
the same set of facts. This parallel, complementary jurisdiction in essence recognizes two 
independent rights and duties of care in any ordinary tort law action.63 The first is a traditional 
duty of care owed by the private actor in his/her private capacity to the victim; and the second is 
now a new structural (i.e., constitutional) duty owed by a state entity to that same victim. While 
the victim is at liberty to pursue either action or indeed both, enforcing the structural duty is 
consciously rendered easier and more expeditious; meaning that individuals have every incentive 
to pursue a public law claim to the exclusion of a private law one. In effect then, tort law claims 
have their duty of care bifurcated into a purely private one (owed by an individual), and a 
structural one (owed by the state). 
The analytic bifurcation of the duty is of course beneficial to litigants in practice. As a 
systemic matter however, it interferes with the fundamental normative premises of tort law. 
According to a dominant school of thought, tort law’s principal purpose is thought to lie in its 
ability to deter socially harmful behavior of different kinds, by forcing defendants to internalize 
the costs of their actions.64 For this purpose to work however, it is obviously crucial that the 
actor saddled with the costs have the actual ability to change its behavior (and the outcome) in 
future cases. The deterrent function thus works because a careless driver is in a position to drive 
more carefully, in anticipation of (or in reaction to) having to bear the costs of carelessness. 
When the individual/entity on whom the costs are imposed has no ability to change the primary 
behavior that is causally responsible for those costs, liability is incapable of producing 
deterrence. In addition, it emboldens risk-taking by the causally responsible actor, since that 
actor now knows that the costs will be borne by someone else. This is the basic idea of a “moral 
hazard” and is common in the context of insurance.65 Imposing liability on an independent state 
actor, and thereby eliminating (or reducing) a claimant’s need for commencing an action against 
the private actor that is causally responsible for the harm, generates a distinct moral hazard. 
Thus, having a government health department compensate a claimant for the negligent behavior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 To be sure, I am not claiming that this has already occurred as an empirical matter. Given that lower court opinions are yet to 
be systematically reported and published in India, validating this concern is impossible at this stage. Yet, my claim is that the risk 
of this occurring is pervasive, since the higher judiciary generates more decisions that fall into the public law/tort law category 
than those that fall into the category of strict private law actions. 
63 See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to Assumption of Risk, Attractive 
Nuisance, and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 329 (2006). 
64 See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 
(1994). 
65 See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 QUART. J. ECON. 541 (1979); Steven Shavell, On Liability and 
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of a doctor employed at a government hospital without the doctor himself/herself being held 
liable in his/her individual capacity is unlikely to deter future negligent behavior,66 and might 
indeed serve to induce such behavior since the claim effectively operates as a mechanism of 
insurance for individual action. In short, while victims might be made better off by public law 
based compensatory mechanisms, so too are actual and potential tortfeasors, since the costs of 
their behavior are borne by an altogether distinct state actor. 
 
4. Claim Impersonalization 
 
Even if one rejects the idea that tort law’s primary purpose lies in deterring behavior, and 
locates it instead in the realization of corrective justice, the analytic bifurcation of duty created 
by the Indian higher judiciary remains equally problematic. In the corrective justice view, the 
institution of tort law operates by recognizing that a defendant’s harm-producing actions require 
correction not just through the payment of compensation, but in addition by ensuring that such 
compensation come from the actual wrongdoer who is directly responsible for the wrong.67 
Central to this understanding is therefore a concept described by corrective justice theorists as 
the idea of “personality,” which refers to the actors’ capacity for purposiveness in their actions.68 
It is only because an actor is capable of purposive action—to avoid the injustice that is causally 
produced—that tort law’s ascription of responsibility becomes defensible under the corrective 
justice idea.69 In other words, an actor’s direct ability to alter the injury-causing behavior is 
critical even to tort law’s goal of corrective justice. When this attribute is eliminated, tort law 
ceases to work as an institution of corrective justice, and instead becomes a mechanism of mere 
distributive justice, where the system’s principal goal lies in redistributing the benefits and 
burdens of society.70  
Consequently, while the bifurcation of the duty may ensure payment to the victim, the 
fact that it comes from an actor other than the immediate wrongdoer undermines the goal of 
corrective justice. With compensation being readily obtained in public law actions, tort victims 
have little incentive to bring private law claims premised on the same set of facts. In the absence 
of such claims, the Indian hybrid public law/tort law claim effectively impersonalizes the injury 
as well as the claim in its compensatory zeal, thereby eliminating corrective justice from the 
system.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Much has been written about the virtues of India’s constitutional rights revolution. Prior 
to its advent, access to courts was seen as largely illusory. In seeking to remedy this, the 
phenomenon of public interest litigation has come to play a fairly important role within the 
overall legal system. All the same, it has come at a rather significant cost: the entrenchment of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 What complicates this particular scenario is of course the presence of criminal liability for medical negligence in India. 
67 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 3-4 (2012). 
68 Id. at 21-29. 
69 Id. at 25 (“[P]ersonality as the capacity for purposiveness contains the indispensable conditions for the ascription of 
responsibility for the effects of one’s actions.”). 
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the legal system’s disdain for the extant processes and instrumentalities of justice. By shifting 
attention, decision-making, and recourse to itself in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction the Indian 
higher judiciary has only rendered more salient the ineffectiveness of India’s lower courts, and 
the adversarial processes that they employ. 
 Nowhere is this more true than in relation to standard tort claims in India. By developing 
a parallel jurisprudence of public wrongs that are adjudicated as public law claims, the higher 
judiciary has successfully relegated to constitutional law matters that in most countries form the 
core of private law adjudication. Courts, lawyers, and litigants today celebrate this development 
as representing a highpoint in India’s constitutional development. While they may indeed have 
something to celebrate in terms of the system’s efficacy, simplicity, and transparency; these very 
virtues hide important fault lines that the courts’ jurisprudence has produced. The system’s 
efficacy has compromised on the traditional legal rules of evidence presentation and causal 
inference; its simplicity has for no independently justifiable reason successfully obfuscated 
various substantive tort law doctrines; and its supposed transparency has made much of the 
system “discretionary” at the remedial and adjectival levels. Every revolution has its casualties; 
and one prime casualty of India’s rights revolution in this regard has been its already-ailing 
private law apparatus. 
